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Abstract 
Based on a sample of mid-tier and top-tier internationally active banks with five-year senior CDS, 
this paper investigates  the determinants of CDS spreads and whether CDS spreads can be 
considered a good proxy of bank performance. The analysis encompasses three time periods: a pre-
crisis period (1 January 2005 - 30 June 2007); a crisis period (1 July 2007 - 31 March 2009) and a 
post-crisis period (1 April 2009  – 30 June 2011) and focuses exclusively on bank specific balance 
sheet ratios.  The results of the empirical analysis indicate that bank CDS spreads, both in the pre-
crisis period, but expecially in the crisis period, reflect the risk captured by bank balance sheet 
ratios. We find that the determinants of bank CDS spreads vary strongly across time, as economic 
and financial conditions vary. TIER 1 ratio and leverage appear insignificant in all of the three 
periods considered, while liquidity indicators become significant only during the crisis and post 
crisis period. 
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1. Introduction 
Banks have played a crucial role in the making and spread of the recent financial crisis. Indeed, at 
the most critical moment of the crisis, the key player was none other than a bank, Lehman Brothers, 
whose default sparked the most acute phase, and had a number of immediate repercussions on the 
whole system.1 The demise of the American investment bank is considered an important event not 
only because it was responsible for a sudden collapse in global business confidence – it was the first 
time that a major bank was allowed to fail - but also because it marked a watershed in the history of 
credit default swaps (CDS). The bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers in September 2008 and, shortly 
afterwards, the near downfall of the insurance conglomerate American International Group (AIG), 
both of which were involved in the CDS sector, polarised attention towards the CDS activities of 
the major international banks. 
CDS, the most widespread form of credit derivative, have been, according to some, responsible for 
exacerbating the effects of the recent financial crisis (Dickinson, 2008; Stulz, 2009; Kress, 2010).  
CDS were originally created in the 1990s by JP Morgan, and consist of an agreement between two 
parties, the so-called protection buyer and protection seller. The protection seller undertakes, in 
exchange for a premium paid by the protection buyer, to pay out if a specific credit event2 occurs, 
typically the default of a third debtor, the so-called reference entity. CDS are thus contracts that 
make it possible to isolate and transfer credit risk (Ashraf et al., 2007, Jarrow, 2011). Owing to 
these constituent features, CDS spreads have become increasingly popular as a simple, direct 
indicator of a firm’s credit risk, especially during the financial crisis.3 As pointed out by Hart and 
Zingales (2010), a CDS can be seen as a bet on an institution’s strength and therefore its price or 
spread reflects the probability that the debt will not be repaid in full. Put simply, the CDS spread 
can be seen as an indication of the risk the bank will fail. When banks’ risk increase, one would 
expect CDS spreads to increase thus providing direct market discipline and influence bank risk 
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taking behaviour (and/or trigger regulatory action). However, in practice the functioning of this 
market discipline mechanism is not clear cut and depends both on the financial system institutional 
structure (for example, the design of the safety net, the strength of property rights, the incentives to 
information disclosure) and on investors’ behaviour and macroeconomic conditions. 
Balasubramnian and Cyree (2011) document  that the yields spreads on bank-issued subordinated 
notes and debentures (SNDs) are sensitive to bank risk, but the presence of implicit guarantees such 
as the too-big-to-fail policy, may reduce the levels to which they reflect bank-specific risks. A 
number of studies seem to indicate that, because of its inherent characteristics, the CDS market is 
more efficient than the bond market in pricing credit risk and in anticipating rating changes (Zhu, 
2004; Di Cesare and Guazzarotti, 2010). Nonetheless, the recent financial crisis cast doubt on the 
effectiveness of CDS spreads as an indicator of risk, as it became evident that the dramatic 
increases in CDS spreads could not be fully  explained by increases in banks credit risk. During the 
period 1 July 2007 to 31 March 2009 CDS spread values grew considerably and displayed record 
peaks (see Figure 1) that can only be explained taking into account the overall market situation.  
As pointed out by Annaert et al. (2010), CDS spread changes that are driven by the increased credit 
risk of individual financial institutions should signal to regulators that they need to pay closer 
attention to the institution’s financial health. On the other hand, when CDS spread changes are not 
related to fundamentals (as during the crisis period),  the market's ability to correctly price for risk 
becomes questionable. 
This paper aims to build upon this recent strand of the literature (Eichengreen et al., 2009; Huang et 
al., 2009; Raunig and Scheicher, 2009; Annaert et al., 2010; Constantinos, 2010; Demirgüç-Kunt 
and Huizinga, 2010; Hart and Zingales, 2010; and Norden and Weber, 2010) by investigating the 
determinants of CDS spreads to understand whether CDS spreads can be considered a good proxy 
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for bank risk. In particular, we estimate the relationship between bank balance sheet ratios and bank 
CDS spreads both in the pre-crisis period, in the crisis and post-crisis period.  
This paper makes three contributions to the related literature. Firstly, this study is one of few 
concerned exclusively with bank CDS spreads at an international level: most other studies examine 
a mix of industrial and financial firms.4 A number of reasons led to the decision to consider only 
CDSs spreads in the banking sector. Very little is known about what actually drives credit spreads 
in general and bank CDS spreads in particular (Annaert et al., 2010). Moreover, variables that are 
found to affect credit spreads of non-financial companies often lose their explanatory power when 
applied to financials (e.g. Boss and Scheicher, 2005;  Raunig and Scheicher, 2008). 
Our second contribution relates to the analysis of the determinants of CDS spreads; we chose to 
concentrate only on bank balance sheet ratios, rather than considering both market-specific and 
firm-specific factors; with the sole exception of leverage. To the best of our knowledge, no study in 
the related literature has used specifically balance sheet variables to explain variation in CDS 
spreads. Most empirical papers (see for example Collin-Dufresne et al., 2001; Bystrom, 2005; 
Zhang et al., 2005; Das et al., 2006; Duffie et al., 2007; Das et al., 2008) investigating the 
explanatory power of credit risk variables for bond and CDS include in the model several variables 
to proxy for business conditions, market conditions and/or uncertainty (term structure of interest 
rates, market return, market volatility, etc.). We are conscious of the influence market variables 
have on CDS spreads, however in this paper, because of the time period considered, we decided to 
focus only on the correlation between balance sheet ratios and CDS spreads. In periods of financial 
stress, market data fluctuate wildly, therefore biasing the relationship with accounting variables. 
Moreover, changes in market data during a crisis period do not necessarily reflect the changes in 
credit risk but may be driven by investors’ panic and lack of trust. Finally, this paper is one of the 
first contributions on bank CDS spreads that also takes into account the post-crisis period.  
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The results of the empirical analysis can be summarised as follows. Firstly, bank CDS spreads 
reflect the risk captured by bank balance sheet ratios. Hence bank CDS spreads are a good proxy of 
bank risk. Secondly, the relationship between bank CDS spreads and balance sheet ratios becomes 
stronger during the crisis and post-crisis period. Thirdly, bank CDS spreads seems to be influenced 
by different variables in the pre-crisis and crisis period. Fourthly, variables that a priory would be 
considered as determinants of CDSs spread, the TIER 1 Ratio and the Leverage, appear 
insignificant in all of the periods considered. Finally, as expected, the bank CDS market in the pre-
crisis period showed little interest in any of the liquidity indices considered.  
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents a review of the relevant 
literature. Sections 3 and 4 discuss data and empirical methodology respectively. Sections 5 and 6 
present empirical results and robustness tests. Finally, Section 7 summarises the major findings and 
concludes the paper. 
 
2. Literature review 
Research on CDS spreads is still limited, mostly because the credit derivatives market in general 
and the CDS market in particular has only gained a substantial size since the early 2000s.5 
The CDS literature is composed of two groups of studies, one focussing on the pricing 
characteristics of CDS spreads, and the other investigating the determinants of CDS spreads and 
their variation. 
To the first group belong the empirical analyses that demonstrate the price leadership of CDS 
spreads over corporate bond spreads in measuring firm-specific credit risk. Various reasons underlie 
this claim. Hull et al. (2004), Das and Hanouna (2006), Zhu (2006) and Ericsson et al. (2009) point 
out that CDS contracts are quoted directly in term of spreads6, while bond spreads require a number 
of complicating assumptions and calculations, for example, the specification of a benchmark risk 
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free yield curve before credit spreads can be calculated. Blanco et al. (2005), Zhu (2006), 
Alexopoulou et al. (2009), and Norden and Weber (2009) show that the CDS market leads the 
corporate bond market in terms of price discovery. Volz and Wedow (2010), Constantinos (2010), 
Flannery (2010), Norden and Weber (2010) find that CDS markets convey information on banks’ 
default risk that is suited to play an important role in enhancing market discipline. In particular, they 
believe that the CDS market is of particular importance for banking supervisors. 
The second group comprises the empirical analyses that investigate the determinants of CDS 
spreads. The credit risk literature identifies two different approaches: the structural approach and 
the reduced form approach.  
The structural models, derived from the option pricing model originally developed by Black and 
Scholes (1973), are based on firms’ structural variables, in other words firm-specific (i.e. rating, 
leverage, market capitalisation, asset volatility, stock price changes, etc.) and market-specific 
factors (i.e. term structure of interest rates, market return, market volatility, etc.), and consider 
default a function of endogenous elements. The first author to apply the option pricing model to 
insolvency was Merton (1974), who based his formulation on the assumption that insolvency arises 
solely and exclusively if at bond maturity date a firm’s assets are worth less its liabilities. 
Subsequently, a number of generalizations on Merton’s model were proposed, the first by Black and 
Cox (1976) (cf. also Longstaff and Schwartz, 1995; Anderson and Sundaresan, 1996; Anderson et 
al., 1996; Mella-Barral, 1997; and Zhou, 2001). These considered the possibility of default prior to 
bond maturity if the value of the firm’s assets fell below a certain level, the threshold or default 
boundary.  
The reduced form models emerged in the second half of the 1990s thanks to contributions from a 
number of scholars (the most significant were Lando, 1994, 1998; Jarrow and Turnbull, 1995; 
Madan and Unal, 1995; Jarrow et al., 1997; Duffie and Singleton, 1999; and more recently Hull and 
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White, 2000, 2001). Reduced form models are a recent approach to credit risk, and treat default as a 
sudden surprise, a totally exogenous event that is unrelated to the firm’s balance sheet. The reason 
for default is not specified. 
The structural models have been widely preferred to the reduced form models by practitioners in the 
field of credit risk, because the reduced form approach has been criticised on the grounds of the 
weak economic rationale for the occurrence of a default event (Alexopoulou et al., 2009). 
There is a substantial literature that builds on the structural models to analyse movements in CDS 
spreads.7 Among the studies focusing on the structural models’ theoretical determinants of CDS 
spreads are Aunon-Nerin et al. (2002), Benkert (2004), Zhang et al. (2005) and Abid and Naifar 
(2006). Recent empirical studies on the determinants of CDS spreads include, among others, 
Annaert et al. (2010), Eichngreen et al. (2009), Ericsson et al. (2009) and Di Cesare and 
Guazzarotti (2010). More recently, alongside the two groups of studies on CDS spreads mentioned 
above, a new current of research has emerged that examines the relationship between CDS spreads 
and rating announcements (Daniels and Shin Jensen, 2004; Hull et al., 2004; Norden and Weber, 
2004; Blanco et al., 2005; and Lehnert and Neske, 2006). Previously, research had analysed the 
impact of credit rating announcements on stock prices, bond prices or both. 
Loosely following the strand of literature on structural models, this paper investigates the 
determinants of bank  CDS spreads, building upon the works of Annaert et al. (2010), Boss and 
Scheicher (2005), Raunig and Scheicher (2008), among others. 
 
3. Data Sample and Descriptive Statistics  
3.1 Data description 
The study considers only mid-tier and top-tier international banking groups (by total assets) with 
five-year senior CDS spreads. The decision to focus on CDS spreads in the banking sector had a 
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decisive impact on sample size, given that only a limited number of banks are involved in CDS 
activities, and in credit derivatives in general. Indeed this type of business is highly concentrated 
among a restricted number of big banks.8 There are overall 89 international banks with senior CDS 
spreads at 5 years. In addition, the decision to use quarterly balance sheet data rather than annual 
data reduced the sample as not all banks with CDS contracts report financial data on a quarterly 
basis. For these reasons, the final sample is thus composed of 57 international banks, 43 of which 
European, 7 are US, 4 are Australian and 3 Japanese banks. See Table A in the appendix for details 
on the final sample. 
The overall time horizon comprises the period from 1 January 2005, the year in which International 
Accounting Standards (IAS/IFRS) became mandatory for the preparation of consolidated financial 
statements of European banks, to 30 June 2011, the last data available at the time of this study. This 
time period is then divided into three sub-period. The first sub-period is the pre-crisis period (from 
1 January 2005 through 30 June 2007). This time was typified by very moderate CDS spreads. It is 
widely accepted that the outbreak of the sub-prime crisis occurred in July 2007. Therefore, we 
specify our second sub-period, the crisis period (from 1 July 2007 to 31 March 2009). During this 
time, CDS spread values grew considerably and displayed record peaks. We decided to end the 
crisis period at March 2009, as in subsequent months bank CDS spreads (and notably peak values), 
levelled off at values below those seen previously (see Figure 1) but higher than pre-crisis period 
values (European Central Bank, 2009b; Bank for International Settlements, 2010). Finally,  our 
third period encompasses the less acute phase of the crisis (or post crisis period) and covers the 
most immediate aftermath of the crisis to date (from 1 April 2009 to 30 June 211). This period thus 
examines the beginning of the recovery phase, when bank CDS spreads began gradually to 
decrease. 
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[Insert Figure 1] 
 
3.2 Dependent variable 
This paper uses as dependent variable five-year senior CDS spreads in the banking sector. CDS 
spreads were chosen since they are widely considered an excellent indicator of markets’ perception 
of a firm’s default risk. The chosen data category, collected from Datastream, is ‘CDS Premium 
Mid’, which corresponds to the average of ‘CDS premium bid’ and ‘CDS premium offered’, and 
shows the mid rate spread between the entity and the relevant benchmark curve. The rate is 
expressed in basis points (bp). This study uses five-year quotes in so far as this is the benchmark 
maturity in the CDS market. Senior CDS spreads were used since senior offers better data coverage 
than subordinated. Quarterly CDS spreads were used, a choice strictly related to the type of 
explanatory variables considered (balance sheet variables). The daily frequency of CDS spreads 
was adjusted to that of the explanatory variables.  
Table A in the appendix presents descriptive statistics of senior 5 year CDS spreads for the 57 
banks comprsing our sample in the pre-crisis period (1 January 2005 - 30 June 2007), for the crisis 
period (1 July 2007 - 31 March 2009) and for the post crisis period (1 April 2009 - 30 June 2011).  
Prior to the recent financial crisis, the CDS spreads of sample banks, regardless of geographical 
area, were moderate and fairly homogeneous. In particular, average CDS spread values ranged from 
6.21 bp (Rabobank) to 68.13 bp (Banque Federale des Banques). The standard deviation of CDS 
spreads of the banks in the study were all below average values. Furthermore, the majority of 
sample banks recorded very similar minimum values, ranging from 1 to 12 bp. The same is true of 
peak values that ranged between 20 and 40 bp on average. 
Conversely, clear differences between geographical areas emerge from analysis of CDS spreads in 
the second period. During the crisis, though all sample bank CDS spreads showed a tendency to 
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grow, in geographical terms such growth was heterogeneous. The Anglo-Saxon countries were 
worst hit by the financial crisis: first and foremost the US, followed by Ireland and the UK, due 
principally to the prevalence of the Originate to Distribute (OTD) banking model, but also to 
excessive financial leverage. Average CDS spread values, but in particular exceptionally high peak 
values, well in excess of average sample bank values, were recorded by US banks: Washington 
Mutual Inc. (maximum: 6,235 bp), National City Corporation (maximum: 2,969), Wachovia 
Corporation (maximum: 1,560 bp); by Irish banks: Anglo Irish Bank Corporation (maximum: 950 
bp), Bank of Ireland (maximum: 670 bp), Allied Irish Banks (maximum: 646 bp); and by UK 
banks: Bradford & Bingley (maximum: 1,591 bp), HBOS PLC (maximum: 500 bp), and Alliance & 
Leicester (maximum: 471 bp). All were thrown into crisis due to massive losses on structured 
financial products and, with the exception of Washington Mutual Inc., were bailed out though take-
overs by other more solid banks, governments bailouts (nationalisation or recapitalisation), or cash 
injections from their respective central banks.  
The remaining sample banks recorded more moderate average and peak CDS spread values that 
were nevertheless above average values in the preceding period, evidence of a reasonable ability to 
withstand the difficulties that overwhelmed the Anglo-Saxon banks. The sole exceptions were the 
Spanish banks Caja De Ahorros De Valencia Castellon Y Alicante Bancaja (maximum: 1,148 bp) 
and Caja de Madrid (maximum: 750 bp), the Belgian banks Fortis (maximum: 666 bp) and Dexia 
SA (maximum: 550 bp), and the Austrian bank Erste Group Bank AG (maximum: 487 bp). 
During the crisis the standard deviations of CDS spreads were below average values; in certain 
cases standard deviations equalled zero when banks formally had a CDS contract but traded very 
little. This was the case of the French Banque Federale Des Banques, and, in the pre-crisis period, 
the Spanish Banco de Sabadell SA. 
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Finally, in the post crisis period (1 April 2009 - 30 June 2011), Table A shows that just under half 
of sample banks recorded lower average CDS spread values than during the crisis period. 
Nevertheless, almost all peak values were lower, with the exception of most of Portuguese, Spanish, 
Irish and Italian banks. In the post crisis period, bank CDS spreads of these countries, due to 
national debt crisis, grew again despite not to levels reached in the previous acute phase of the 
crisis.9 Minimum values were higher than the previous period. The standard deviations of sample 
bank CDS spreads were almost all below average values.  
 
3.3 Explanatory variables 
This study uses as explanatory variables eight balance sheet ratios, in order of analysis profile pre-
calculated by Bloomberg on the Global format. Quarterly data was selected rather than annual data 
to make available a higher number of observations for analysis. 
The eight balance sheet ratios by management area and their hypotesed relationship (irrespective of 
the time horizon considered) with the dependent variable are outlined below and summarised in 
Table 1.  
 
Asset quality 
Loan Loss Reserve/Gross Loans (%), qa1.  
This ratio expresses the percentage value of total credits appropriated to the depreciation fund. It is 
a reserve for losses expressed as percentage of total loans. The higher the ratio, the lower the quality 
of the loan portfolio. Hence, an increase in qa1 should lead to an increase CDS spreads. 
 
Unreserved Impaired Loans/Equity (%), qa2. 
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This ratio is also known as the ‘capital impairment ratio’. An increase in the ratio should signal a 
greater probability of default. As such, a positive relationship between change in qa2 and change in 
CDS spreads is hypothesised. 
 
Capital 
TIER 1 Ratio10 (%), pat1. 
This ratio measures the capital adequacy of a bank. In particular, TIER 1 capital ratio measures the 
ability of the bank to absorb losses. The higher the ratio, the higher the risk buffer and the lower 
should be the CDS spreads. Hence, a negative sign is expected. 
 
Leverage: Equity/Total Assets (%), pat2.  
There are different definitions of leverage - balance sheet, economic, and embedded - and no single 
measure can capture all dimensions simultaneously. The first definition is based on balance sheet 
concepts, the second on market-dependent future cash flows, and the third on market risk. Balance 
sheet leverage is the most visible and widely recognised form and it is one adopted in this study. 
The leverage ratio, defined as Equity/Total Assets, reflects the level of indebtedness of a firm. One 
would expect that as equity diminishes, with constant total assets, the proportion of debts to total 
assets should increase, as should the level of indebtedness and hence the risk of default. A negative 
sign is therefore expected between Leverage and CDS spreads.  
With the choice of these two variables, we are close to Almer et al. (2008) who investigated the 
determinants of short-and long-term bank CDS spreads using cross-sectional regressions; the 
authors also used as explanatory variables the following: ‘Insolvency Factors’: Loan Loss Reserve 
(%), Loan Loss Provision (%), % of Problem Loans, Pre-Tax-Profit (%) and Long-term Rating. 
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Furthermore, leverage is the only explanatory variable used in this paper that is also present in 
Merton’s model.  
 
Operations 
ROA (Return On average Assets) (%), op1. 
This ratio is an indicator of the return on a firm’s investments. The sign linking ROA to CDS 
spreads is uncertain, as the market may interpret the relationship between these variables either 
negatively or positively. In particular, a bank that undertakes numerous investments (low ROA) 
may be perceived by the market as being very risky. In this case, low ROA values would 
correspond to high CDS spreads. On the other hand, the market may react positively if it assumed 
that high levels of investment are capable of creating positive income and future cash flows. In this 
case moderate ROA values would correspond to low CDS spreads.  
Further, a negative relationship between ROA and CDS may be due to a decrease (or an increase) in 
operating income at the same level of investment. In such case, a decrease (increase) in ROA would 
correspond to an increase (decrease) in CDS spreads.  
 
ROE (Return On average Equity) (%), op2. 
This ratio is an index of the return on own equity. The higher ratio, the lower the perceived default 
risk. Hence, a negative sign is expected. 
 
Liquidity11 
Net Loans/Deposits & Short Term Funding (%), liq1. 
The loan-to-deposit ratio is a measure of liquidity. The relationship linking this index to CDS 
spreads is uncertain. The relationship can be interpreted positively when banks with fewer deposits, 
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and hence lower liquidity, are not perceived positively by the market. An increase in liq1 should 
therefore correspond to growth in CDS spreads. On the other hand, the relationship can be 
interpreted negatively when a high level of loans, for the same level of deposits, is perceived by the 
market as a positive signal, since sample banks are commercial banks and loans represent their core 
business. Growth in liq1 should therefore correspond to a decrease in CDS spreads.  
 
Liquid Assets/Deposits & Short Term Funding (%), liq2. 
A further measure of liquidity is the ratio of Liquid Assets to Deposits and Short Term Funding. 
The higher this percentage, the more liquid the bank and the less vulnerable to a classic run. Hence, 
a negative sign is expected. An increase in liq2 should decrease CDS spreads. Similarly, Almer et 
al. (2008) considered as ‘Illiquidity Factors’ also the ratio of Total Money Market Funding to Total 
Liabilities (the so-called % of Wholesale Funding). 
 
[Insert Table 1] 
 
Table 2 reports descriptive statistics relating to the eight balance sheet variables of the sample banks 
for the pre-crisis period (1 January 2005 - 30 June 2007), the crisis period (1 July 2007 - 31 March 
2009) and the post crisis period (1 April 2009 - 30 June 2011).  
Unlike CDS spreads, the values of balance sheet variables did not change significantly from the pre-
crisis period to the crisis period. The only exception is the average value of qa2. Furthermore, most 
sample banks recorded homogeneous values for almost all variables in all periods, with the 
exception of the banks that incurred vast losses during the crisis and/or were bailed out by 
government intervention (principally the UK, Irish and US banks).   
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In particular, the average value of qa1 remained substantially unchanged, from the pre-crisis period 
to the crisis period for almost all banks in the study. Conversely, the other indicator of asset quality, 
qa2, fell considerably, probably due to the numerous capital increases carried out by the banks in 
difficulty during the crisis. The average qa2 value of the sample banks decreased from 137 per cent 
in the pre-crisis period to 28 per cent during the crisis. This fall was principally attributable to two 
banks, Banco Espirito Santo and Credit Suisse, both of which recorded a significant fall in this 
index. Conversely, other sample banks – principally the UK, Irish and US banks – recorded strong 
growth in qa2 during the crisis. Such growth was the result of deterioration in the quality of capital, 
and affected the Belgian banks Dexia and KBC Groep NV, the Austrian Raiffeisen International 
Bank Holding, the Swedish Swedbank AB and the Japanese Mizuho Financial Group.  
The variables relating to the banks’ financial structure, pat1 and pat2, remained substantially 
unchanged from the pre-crisis period to the crisis period. Overall, the majority of sample banks, 
despite being adversely affected by the crisis, exhibited a capital coefficient (pat1) well above the 
minimum regulatory threshold both before and during the crisis. The average value of pat2 declined 
from 5.3 per cent in the pre-crisis period to 5.1 per cent during the crisis.  However, while the ratio 
of Equity to Total Assets remained substantially unchanged during the crisis for the majority of UK 
banks, it showed a tendency to increase for large European banks, but above all for US commercial 
banks. Overall, at a global level, the financial leverage of the sample banks remained high.  
The profitability indices, op1 and op2, both declined, but at different rates. In particular, the average 
op1 value of sample banks fell by three percentage points, while average op2 values halved from 18 
per cent to 4 per cent. During the crisis, negative average ROA and ROE values were recorded 
principally by UK, Irish and US banks. 
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The two liquidity indices considered, liq1 and liq2, show fairly similar average values between the 
pre-crisis period and the crisis period. In particular, the former ratio decreased slightly from 82 per 
cent to 80 per cent, while the latter decreased slightly from 48 per cent to 46 per cent. 
The last panel of Table 2 highlights how in the post crisis period the average value of all eight 
balance sheet variables remained substantially unchanged with respect to the previous period. The 
exceptions were qa1, op1 and op2. In particular, in the post crisis period the average value of qa1 
showed a tendency to grow (from 1.6 per cent to 2.5 per cent) principally due to an increase in 
devaluation of loans. The average value of the two income ratios continued to fall in the post crisis 
period, principally due to a significant deterioration in the asset quality of most sample banks. From 
the crisis period to the post crisis period, op1 declined from 0.5 per cent to 0.1 per cent, while op2 
fell from 4 per cent to 1.8 per cent. Finally, the average value of the two liquidity indices increased 
in the post crisis period: liq1 increased from 80 per cent to 87 per cent, principally thanks to a 
moderate recovery, while liq2 grew from 46 per cent to 48 per cent. 
 
[Insert Table 2] 
 
Time-series graphs were plotted to show the relationship between average bank CDS spreads and 
each explanatory variable. Furthermore, correlation coefficients were calculated between balance 
sheet variables and CDS spreads. Figure A in the appendix shows the time series graphs of average 
CDS spreads versus the eight balance sheet variables for the pre-crisis period (January 2005 - June 
2007) and the crisis period (July 2007 - March 2009).12 The panels in Figure A show a clear 
reversal in the CDS trend and in that of the majority of explanatory variables at the start of the third 
quarter of 2007, the time of the outbreak of the financial crisis. Furthermore, for most graphs, the 
relationships observed in Figure A are readily interpreted principally during the crisis period. 
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During this period, the signs predicted in Table 1 were largely confirmed (with the exception of 
pat1). Panel A shows the relationship between average CDS spreads and average qa1 values while 
Panel B presents the relationship between average CDS spreads and average qa2 values. As 
predicted, the time series of average CDS spreads versus average qa1 values, in the period between 
July 2007 and March 2009, showed the positive trend expected. Conversely, the relationship 
between average CDS spreads and average qa2 values showed a negative sign rather than the 
positive one expected. 
Panel C presents the time-series of average CDS spreads versus average pat1 values. The 
relationship is positive in the crisis period, contrary to what was expected. CDS spreads thus tended 
to increase, rather than to decrease, with growth in pat1. 
Panel D presents the time-series of average CDS spreads versus average of pat2 values. In this case, 
during the crisis period, the expected sign (negative) was respected. As equity decreased, with total 
assets held constant, the incidence of debts on total assets increased, as did the level of indebtedness 
and consequently the risk of default. Panel D illustrates that sample banks displayed high levels of 
leverage, not only in the crisis period but also in the pre-crisis period, when bank CDS spreads 
remained low. This implies that until the onset of the crisis, markets were not concerned by the very 
high leverage of banks. Only at the outbreak of the crisis (July 2007) did CDS spread values begin 
to rise significantly. Hence the outbreak of crisis was one of factors responsible for growth in bank 
CDS spreads, and not excessive leverage itself, although excessive bank leverage is considered one 
of the determinants of the crisis. In other words, contrary to what was expected, Leverage was not 
among the key determinants of bank CDS spreads. 
This result seem to contradict those of the structural models’ approach in general and the recent 
conclusions of Di Cesare e Guazzarotti (2010) in particular, who find that leverage remains one of 
the most significant variables in explaining CDSs spreads for US non-financial firms even during 
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the crisis period. However, it is important to recall that leverage of a bank is fundamentally a 
different variable from a firm’s leverage. Indeed, prior to the crisis, quantitative limits on bank 
leverage were rare and only post-crisis there are talks of introducing bank leverage limits as an 
additional prudential tool to complement minimum capital adequacy requirements. Our study 
underlines the difference between the financial and non-financial sector CDSs and casts doubts on 
the predicitive value of models and combine both financial and non-financial firms. This outcome 
confirms the findings of Annaert et al. (2010), according to which variables that are found to affect 
credit spreads of non-financial companies often lose their explanatory power when applied to 
financials. 
Panel E shows the relationship between average CDS spreads and average op1 values while Panel F 
shows the relationship between average CDS spreads and average of op2 values. Panel E highlights 
a clearly negative relationship during the crisis. Hence the market gives a negative interpretation to 
low ROA in times of crisis. Panel F also shows a negative relationship: moderate ROE values 
increase the perceived probability of default. 
Panel G presents the time-series of average CDS spreads versus average of liq1 values and 
highlights a negative relationship during the crisis, particularly from 2008 onwards. The market 
thus interprets positively a high level of loan activity in times of crisis. Panel H presents the time-
series of average CDS spreads versus average liq2 values. In this case also the expected sign 
(negative) is respected.  
Table 3 shows the correlations between each explanatory balance sheet variable and CDS spreads, 
both for the pre-crisis period (January 2005 - June 2007) and for the crisis period (July 2007 - 
March 2009). Since results for the post crisis period are not significantly different from the crisis 
period, these are not reported. 
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Table 3 shows a reversal in the trend of CDS spreads and the majority of explanatory variables (6 
variables out of 8) at the start of the third quarter 2007, with the outbreak of the financial crisis. 
Furthermore, Table 3 highlights how the expected signs (illustrated in Table 1) are principally 
respected during the crisis. The sole exception is the sign of the TIER 1 Ratio (qa1), which differs 
from that expected during the crisis period.13  
[Insert Table 3] 
 
4. Empirical Methodology 
To determine whether balance sheet data explains bank CDS spreads, we follow a panel data 
regression. Indeed, as our sample includes banks having both sufficient valid CDS spreads and 
quarterly accounting data (recall that the sample includes only mid-tier and top-tier international 
banking groups with five-year senior CDS spreads) it is not a random sample and it is possible to 
assume that our results could not be generalised to all banks.  
In particular, we specify the following generic model: 
itcrisisitit dosBankBSratiCDS   )(                                            (1) 
 
where i is the subscript identifying the bank and t indicates the time period (the quarter in progress). 
In this model we introduce only time-varying bank-specific explanatory variables (balance sheet 
ratios: BankBSratios) but not time-varying market-wide explanatory variables. dcrisis is the dummy 
variable that identifies the outbreak of the recent financial crisis (1 July 2007) and εit is the error. 
In the first instance, the regressions were conducted covering the entire time horizon (1 January 
2005 - 30 June 2011); a first regression  including only the eight balance sheet variables; a second 
one including the eight variables plus the dummy crisis (from 1 July 2007). 
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Subsequently, to determine whether the relationship between bank CDS spreads and balance sheet 
data changes with varying macroeconomic and financial conditions, three further panel regressions 
were performed: one on the period preceding the crisis (1 January 2005 - 30 June 2007), one the 
crisis period (1 July 2007 - 31 March 2009) and a last one on the post crisis period (1 April 2009 - 
30 June 2011).14 
In all the regressions, levels rather than differences were used, for both dependent and explanatory 
variables. Note that the goal of this paper is not to predict but to explain credit spreads, hence, we 
use contemporaneous dependent and explanatory variables. 
 
5. Results  
Table 4 reports the results of the first two panel regressions (without and with the dummy crisis), 
both conducted on the entire time horizon (1 January 2005 - 30 June 2011). For both regressions the 
final sample consisted of 1256 observations for 57 banks. Table 4 indicates that the balance sheet 
variables explain nearly 64 per cent of bank CDS spreads (Adjusted R-squared value); and that the 
balance sheet indices and the dummy crisis together explain 67 per cent of bank CDS spreads 
(Adjusted R-squared). From the first panel regression it emerges that, with the exception of liq1, all 
the explanatory variables are significant and have the expected sign (with two exceptions: qa2 is 
negative rather than positive, and pat1 is positive rather than negative). 
In the case of qa2, Panel B in Figure A shows how the relationship between this variable and bank 
CDS spreads was inversely proportionate during both the pre-crisis and the crisis periods. In 
particular, Panel B highlights how, in the pre-crisis period, high qa2 values corresponded to very 
low CDS spreads. This implies that in the pre-crisis period, the market was not concerned with the 
poor quality of bank loan portfolios. Moreover, Panel B shows that in the crisis period, a fall in qa2 
resulted in a rise rather than a fall in bank CDS spreads. The abrupt decrease in this relationship is 
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most probably attributable to the numerous capital increases carried out by many banks in difficulty 
during the crisis. Evidently, recapitalisation, particularly through injection of government funds, 
was perceived negatively by the market, as a sign of crisis in the banking sector. This may have 
contributed to the increase in bank CDS spreads. For an explanation of the reasons for the 
unexpected sign of pat1, see the discussion of the crisis period regression panel below.  
From the second regression panel it emerges that the dummy crisis is significant and therefore 
indicates that the crisis was a relevant event in the relationship between bank CDS spreads and 
balance sheet data, as expected. 
To understand whether the relationship between bank CDS spreads and balance sheet data changes 
with varying macroeconomic conditions, two further panel regressions were conducted, one on the 
sub-period1 January 2005 - 30 June 2007, the other on the sub-period 1 July 2007 - 31 March 2009. 
The final sample consisted of 506 observations for 53 banks in the pre-crisis period and 354 
observations for 55 banks in the crisis period (see Table 4). 
Table 4 shows that the explanatory power of the balance sheet variables thus grew 5 per cent with 
the transition from the pre-crisis period to the crisis period (in terms of Adjusted R-squared). The 
lower explanatory power of the balance sheet ratios during the pre-crisis period is simply because 
bank CDS spreads were flat at that time. As bank CDS spreads grew, so did the explanatory power 
of the balance sheet variables. Overall, the Adjusted R-squared value well in excess of 50 per cent 
in both periods demonstrates how bank CDS spreads in the pre-crisis period, but above all in the 
crisis period, reflect a great deal of the risk expressed by the balance sheet variables. These results 
confirm those reported by Annaert et al. (2010), which suggest that the variables used by structural 
credit risk models are not significant in explaining bank CDS spread changes in the period prior to 
the crisis. 
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In the period preceding the crisis qa1 and op1 are the only significant variables and the sign respect 
those predicted. The results in Table 4 shows a positive relationship between qa1 and bank CDS 
spreads. In terms of the relationship between op1 and CDS spreads, in the pre-crisis period the 
relationship was positive. Hence in the pre-crisis period, a decrease in op1 brought about a decrease 
rather than an increase in bank CDS spreads: evidently, the market associated the fall in ROA with 
a high level of investment capable of generating positive cash and income flows in future. 
It also emerges that, as expected, in the pre-crisis period the bank CDS market did not pay attention 
to any liquidity index. The liquidity crisis (in terms of both market liquidity risk and funding risk) 
was the last manifestation of the recent financial crisis. This outcome confirms the findings of the 
study by Almer et al. (2008), according to which ‘Liquid Factors’ did not have a significant impact 
on bank CDS spreads in the pre-crisis period.  
In the crisis period, on the other hand, the number of significant explanatory variables increased 
with respect to the previous period This indicates that the CDS market probably pays greater 
attention to balance sheet indices particularly in periods of financial stress. However, only one of 
the explanatory variables that were significant during the crisis was significant also during the pre-
crisis period: qa1. This implies that the type of variables to which the market pays attention tends to 
vary as economic and financial conditions vary. This is in line with the finding of Annaert et al. 
(2010) who finds that the determinants of bank CDS spreads vary strongly across time. This finding 
also confirms similar results in studies for bond spreads and indicates that models which attempt to 
explain changes in bank CDS spreads must be re-estimated as macroeconomic conditions change in 
order to give the “right” information to regulators and policy makers. The variables which were 
significant during the crisis are qa1, pat1, op2 and liq1. Conversely, op1 lost significance during the 
crisis period. In particular, as predicted, we find a positive relationship between qa1 and bank CDS 
spreads and a negative relationship between op2 and bank CDS spreads.  
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An analysis of the signs of two of the four significant variables reveals that the probability of 
default tends to increase principally for banks that in recent years had a poor quality loan portfolio, 
and/or lower returns on equity. This outcome confirms the findings of the study by Calice and 
Iannidis (2009), according to which Large Complex Financial Institutions (LCFIs) with large 
exposure to problems assets tend to be adeversely affected by the widening of credit spreads. 
Our results also show that during the crisis period, the relationship between liq1 and CDS spreads 
was negative. During the crisis period, the decrease of liq1 was due principally to a decrease in 
loans (the so-called credit crunch phenomena) and was accompanied by an increase of bank CDS 
spreads.  
Pat1, a significant explanatory variable during the crisis, has a different sign from the one expected: 
positive rather than negative. Pat1 was also positive during the pre-crisis period, although not 
significant. This positive relationship implies that the growth in pat1 was accompanied, in both the 
pre-crisis and the crisis period, by an increase rather than a decrease in the perceived probability of 
bank default. As Panel C of Figure A indicates, the positive relationship between pat1 and CDS 
spreads is particularly evident in the crisis period. The positive (rather than negative) sign of pat1 in 
Table 4 suggests that the market, above all in the crisis period, lacked faith in this capital index. The 
banks in difficulty in the final period, with rapidly growing CDS spreads, had a TIER 1 Ratio well 
in excess of the minimum requirement and also above the average for their geographical area. What 
emerges is thus the limited efficacy of the capital index TIER 1 Ratio in safeguarding banks from 
the potential risk of default. This is confirmed, at least in part, by the Basel Committee December 
2010 final document (Basel 3), that focuses, among other things, on improving the quality of 
regulatory capital. 15 
From the results presented Table 4 it is also evident that qa2 and liq2 are not significant variables 
either in the pre-crisis or in the crisis period.   
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Finally, to investigate whether the relationship between bank CDS spreads and balance sheet data 
changes in the post crisis period (1 April 2009 - 30 June 2011), a fifth panel regression was 
performed (see Table 4). 
The final sample consisted of 396 observations for 47 banks. The results show that in the period that 
takes into account the less acute phase of the crisis (and the beginning of the recovery phase), the 
relationship between balance sheet variables and bank CDS spreads becomes stronger. In the post 
crisis period both liquidity ratios considered (liq 1 and liq2) are significant. This may reflect the 
increased attention paid by regulators to bank liquidity in the post crisis period. In December 2010 
the Basel Committee announced the introduction of two new liquidity standars for banks: the 
Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR), rule of short term, and the Net Stable Funding Ration (NSFR), 
longer-term structural rule. 16 
[Insert Table 4] 
 
6. Robustness Tests 
As the main goal of this paper is not to predict but to explain credit spreads, in the empirical 
analysis we used contemporaneous dependent and explanatory variables. However, bank CDS 
spreads may precede balance sheet data or react to the publication of results. To test this hypothesis, 
a number of further regressions were carried out.  
The first group of regressions considered bank CDS spreads at time t-1, the preceding quarter, and 
balance sheet data at time t, the quarter considered. The second group of panel regressions 
considered bank CDS spreads at time t+1, the quarter following, and balance sheet variables a time 
t. Both regressions with bank CDS spreads at time t-1 and those with bank CDS spreads at time t+1 
were conducted on the overall period considered (1 January 200530 June 2011) and on all  sub-
periods. Table 5, however, presents the results of the three sub-periods only: the pre-crisis period (1 
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January 2005 - 30 June 2007), the crisis period (1 July 2007 - 31 March 2009) and the post crisis 
period (1 April 2009 - 30 June 2011).17  
Comparison of the results of the panel regressions in Table 5 with those of the panel regressions of 
Table 4, which consider both bank CDS spreads and balance sheet variables at time t, reveals that 
bank CDS spreads did not react in advance to the crisis and required less than a three month lag to 
incorporate balance sheet information. The CDS market is thus an efficient market capable of 
reacting to information as it is made public. For this reason, it is correct to consider both bank CDS 
spreads and balance sheet variables at time t. The Adjusted R-squared values in Table 4 in all three 
time periods are higher than those obtained considering bank CDS spreads at time t+1. Moreover, in 
two of the three periods, the crisis period and the post crisis period, values are marginally higher 
even than those obtained considering bank CDS spreads at time t-1.  
[Insert Table 5] 
7. Conclusions  
This paper investigates whether CDS spreads can be considered a good proxy for bank riskiness. 
Based on a sample of mid-tier to top-tier international banks with senior CDS spreads at 5 years, we 
analyse the relationship between bank CDS spreads and balance sheet variables relating to the 
quality of bank assets, capital, earning potential and liquidity. The analysis was conducted on the on 
the period  1 January 2005 – 30 June 2011. This was then subdivided into three sub-periods: the 
pre-crisis period (1 January 2005 - 30 June 2007); the crisis period (1 July 2007 - 31 March 2009) 
and the post crisis period (1 April 2009 - 30 June 2011).  
Results indicate that bank CDS spreads in the pre-crisis period, but especially in the crisis and post 
crisis period, reflect the risk captured by balance sheet ratios. The lower explanatory power of the 
balance sheet indices in the pre-crisis period is mainly due to the fact that bank CDS spreads were 
relatively flat at that time. The crisis was a relevant event in the relationship between bank CDS 
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spreads and balance sheet data. As bank CDS spread grew, so did the explanatory power of the 
balance sheet variables. The relationship between bank CDS spreads and balance sheet ratios grew 
stronger during the crisis period, when a number of explanatory variables became significant. 
Furthermore, bank CDS spreads seem to be influenced by different variables in the pre-crisis and 
crisis period. This finding confirms similar results in studies for both bond and CDSs spreads and 
indicates that models which attempt to explain changes in bank CDS spreads must be re-estimated 
as macroeconomic conditions change in order to give the “right” information to regulators and 
policy makers. Our results also indicate that bank CDS spreads did not react in advance to the crisis 
and required less than a three month lag to incorporate the balance sheet information. The CDS 
market is thus an efficient market capable of reacting to information as it is made public. This cast 
doubts on the ability of CDS spreads to “predict” banks probability of default. 
In terms of individual predictors, the ratio Loan Loss Reserve to Gross Loans is the only significant 
variable in all the three sub-periods considered. The probability of default is likely to increase 
principally for those banks with poor quality loan portfolios. Contrary to prior expectations,  
Leverage and the TIER 1 Ratio were not among the determinants of bank CDS spreads in any of the  
three sub-periods considered. What is more, the sample banks that ran into difficulty almost always 
had a TIER 1 Ratio well above the statutory minimum. Overall, doubts emerge in relation to the 
efficacy of the capital index TIER 1 Ratio as a safeguard against the risk of future default.  
Finally, as expected, the bank CDS market in the pre-crisis period showed no interest in any of the 
liquidity indices considered. Only with the outbreak of the sub prime crisis liquidity indicators 
become significant and remained significant in the post-crisis period, possibily reflecting the 
increased attention paid by regulators to bank liquidity in the new Basle proposals. 
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Tables and Figures 
Figure 1. CDS market. 
          
Notes: In the figure on the left, taken from the BIS Annual Report (2010), the CDS market is based on the CDS spreads 
of 34 large banks and 14 large insurance companies in Europe and North America. Average CDS spread (lhs) is in basis 
points. Dispersion (rhs) is the standard deviation of the cross section of CDS spreads, divided by the contemporaneous 
average.  
The figure on the right show the trend of average CDS spread values for the 57 sample banks. Average values for bank 
CDS spreads are in basis points. 
Source: Bank for International Settlements. 2010. Annual Report, Basel, June (for the figure on the left) and Datastream 
Database (for the figure on the right). 
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Table 1. Explanatory variables and predicted sign 
Variable Description Predicted sign 
Asset Quality     
qa1 Loan Loss Reserve/Gross Loans (%) POSITIVE 
qa2 Unreserved Impaired Loans/Equity (%) POSITIVE 
 
Capital   
  
pat1 TIER 1 Ratio (%) NEGATIVE 
pat2 Leverage: Equity/Total Assets (%) NEGATIVE 
 
Operations   
  
op1 ROA (%) = Net Income/Average Total Assets             NEGATIVE / POSITIVE 
op2 ROE (%) = Net Income/Average Equity NEGATIVE 
 
Liquidity   
  
liq1 Net Loans/Deposits & Short Term Funding (%)       POSITIVE / NEGATIVE 
liq2 Liquid Assets/Deposits & Short Term Funding (%) NEGATIVE 
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Table 2. Summary statistics on eight balance sheet indicators for sample banks 
Variable Pre-crisis period* During the crisis period* Post crisis period* 
 
Mean 
(Std. Dev.) 
Min. – Max. Mean 
(Std. Dev.) 
Min. – Max. Mean 
(Std. Dev.) 
Min. – Max. 
Asset Quality 
 
Qa1 0.014 
(0.009) 
0.000-0.041 0.016 
(0.010) 
0.001-0.051 0.025 
(0.015) 
0.001-0.078  
Qa2 1.370 
(9.505) 
0.000-107.945 0.283 
(1.951) 
-7.866-36.044 0.257 
(1.777) 
-26.7530-4.569  
Capital       
Pat1 0.078 
(0.013) 
0.047-0.139 0.081 
(0.017) 
0.051-0.179 0.105 
(0.023) 
0.043-0.182 
Pat2 0.053 
(0.021) 
0.019-0.104 0.051 
(0.042) 
-0.036-0.386 0.058 
(0.033) 
-0.018-0.295 
Operations       
Op1 0.008 
(0.004) 
-0.001-0.025 0.003 
(0.011) 
-0.091-0.044 0.001 
(0.012) 
-0.104-0.030 
Op2 0.182 
(0.060) 
-0.071-0.562 0.041 
(0.237) 
-2.020-1.445 0.018 
(0.177) 
-1.489-0.422 
Liquidity       
Liq1 0.820 
(0.351) 
0.139-2.031 0.805 
(0.418) 
0.014-2.488 0.875 
(0.677) 
0.015-12.948 
Liq2 0.484 
(0.276) 
0.128-1.530 0.464 
(0.277) 
0.090-1.750 0.487 
(0.295) 
0.082-1.896 
 
Notes: This table reports summary statistics on eight explanatory balance sheet variables for the sample banks for the 
pre-crisis period (1 January 2005 - 30 June 2007), the crisis period (1 July 2007 - 31 March 2009) and the post crisis 
period (1 April 2009 - 30 June 2011). 
* The number of banks in the period preceding the crisis was 53, in the crisis period 55, and in the post crisis period 47. 
The independent variables (qa1, qa2, pat1, pat2, op1, op2, liq1, and liq2) are defined in paragraphs 3.3. 
Source Datastream Database and authors’ calculations. 
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Table 3. Correlations pre-crisis and crisis period 
Variable 
CDS spreads 
       Pre crisis period         During the crisis period 
Qa1 0.0107   0.1174* 
Qa2 -0.0298 0.0133 
Pat1 0.0031   0.1592* 
Pat2  0.1372* -0.0441 
Op1  0.2041* -0.3021* 
Op2  0.1319* -0.3214* 
Liq1 -0.0146  0.1196* 
Liq2  0.1339* -0.1779* 
Notes: The dependent variable (CDS spreads) and the independent variables (qa1, qa2, pat1, pat2, op1, op2, liq1, and 
liq2) are defined respectively in paragraphs 3.2 and 3.3.  
The pre-crisis period spans from 1 January 2005 to 30 June 2007, while the crisis period extends from 1 July 2007 to 31 
March 2009. 
The variables with no * are independent. 
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Table 4. Panel Regressions  
Variable Whole  period 
Whole period and 
dummy crisis 
Pre-crisis  
Period 
During the  
crisis period 
post crisis 
period 
Qa1 
  3019.194*** 
(360.622) 
    3184.293*** 
(342.706) 
339.959* 
(132.078) 
5841.518*** 
(1054.481) 
3578.455*** 
(823.578) 
Qa2 -2.383*** 
        (0.394) 
-1.798*** 
(0.377) 
-0.101 
(0.069) 
-1.018 
(1.747) 
28.410 
(24.794) 
Pat1 809.870*** 
(129.453) 
252.133 
(132.205) 
-38.498 
(61.460) 
2159.72*** 
(411.876) 
978.256** 
(312.541) 
Op1 -4.170.813*** 
(906.371) 
-3396.34*** 
(863.232) 
    1626.445*** 
(349.269) 
2154.717 
(1409.976) 
-13173.09*** 
(3371.008) 
Op2 -206.312*** 
(36.052) 
-152.949*** 
(34.546) 
-3.866 
(11.552) 
-301.503*** 
(55.877) 
128.771 
(119.554) 
Liq1 0.025 
(17.081) 
-29.542 
(16.422) 
2.017 
(4.160) 
-178.760*** 
(41.685) 
-110.261* 
(47.502) 
Liq2 -82.940*** 
(19.160) 
-70.733*** 
(18.223) 
-2.357 
(4.069) 
-26.342 
(40.455) 
-99.579* 
(48.683) 
Dummy crisis       54.940*** 
(4.796) 
   
      
Number of observations 1256 1256 506 354 396 
Number of sample banks 57 57 53 55 47 
Adjusted R-squared 0.6386 0.6742 0.6141 0.6627 0.7329 
Variable Whole  period 
Whole period and 
dummy crisis 
Pre-crisis  
Period 
During the  
crisis period 
post crisis 
period 
Qa1 
  3897.548*** 
(390.638) 
    3376.869*** 
(364.000) 
285.000* 
(128.170) 
5491.569*** 
(1424.575) 
4250.474*** 
(805.759) 
Qa2 -2.273*** 
         (0.462) 
-1.520*** 
(0.431) 
-0.036 
(0.070) 
-0.984 
(2.436) 
46.202 
(24.959) 
Pat2 -312.295 
(169.897) 
-750.698* 
(314.818) 
-261.141*** 
(72.162) 
-2493.139* 
(993.529) 
2141.462* 
(896.981) 
Op1 -4731.896*** 
(1049.319) 
-4208.07*** 
(973.519) 
    1702.289*** 
(327.702) 
-1284.64 
(1905.935) 
-12093.8*** 
(3354.918) 
Op2 -196.451*** 
(41.837) 
-110.0233** 
(39.259) 
-13.423 
(11.602) 
-162.507* 
(77.744) 
119.693 
(120.221) 
Liq1 -9.279 
(20.067) 
-51.343** 
(18.836) 
4.712 
(4.100) 
-193.063** 
(41.803) 
-107.880* 
(47.871) 
Liq2 -66.426** 
(22.369) 
-60.439** 
(20.742) 
-3.826 
(3.938) 
-6.090 
(55.849) 
-86.151 
(49.382) 
Dummy crisis       71.185*** 
(4.996) 
   
      
Number of observations 1301 1301 525 372 404 
Number of sample banks 58 58 56 56 49 
Adjusted R-squared 0.5556 0.6180 0.6223 0.4911 0.7462 
Notes: The dependent variable is CDS spreads which measure the probability of default. The explanatory variables are 
balance sheet ratios referring to asset quality (qa1 and qa2), capital (pat1, pat2), operations (op1 and op2), and liquidity 
(liq1 and liq2). The dummy crisis identifies the start of the crisis (1 July 2007). 
The dependent variable and the independent variables are defined respectively in paragraphs 3.2 and 3.3.  
‘Whole period’ denotes the period from 1 January 2005 to 31 March 2010 (latest data available).  
‘Pre-crisis period’ denotes the period from 1 January 2005 to 30 June 2007. 
‘During the crisis period’ denotes the period from 1 July 2007 to 31 March 2009.  
‘ post crisis period’ denotes the period from 1 April 2009 to 30 June 2011.  
Due to multicollinearity problem between capital explanatory variables (pat1 and pat2), for each time periods 
considered, the panel regression was performed using alternately the two capital ratios. 
Standard Errors of estimated coefficients are reported in parentheses. Adjusted R-squared derives from areg.  
*** denotes coefficient statistically different from zero (1% level, two-tail test), ** 5% level, * 10% level. 
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Table 5. Panel Regressions (Robustness Test) 
   
 
CDS t-1 
 
CDS t+1 
Variable Pre-crisis 
period 
During the 
crisis period 
post crisis 
period 
Pre-crisis  
Period 
During the  
crisis period 
post crisis 
period 
Qa1 168.048 
(181.153) 
   4310.54*** 
(1041.466) 
   3683.421** 
(1118.108) 
334.304 
(175.313)  
  4310.54*** 
(1041.466) 
3683.421** 
(1118.108) 
Qa2 -0.050 
(0.765) 
73.594* 
(34.942) 
-13.973 
(29.081) 
-0.125 
(0.092) 
73.594* 
(34.942) 
-13.973 
(29.081) 
Pat1 -117.531* 
(58.977) 
1128.544** 
(1431.283) 
1270.552** 
(369.058) 
-32.450 
(81.598) 
1128.544** 
(410.269) 
1270.552** 
(369.058) 
Op1 -40.900 
(349.780) 
997.283 
(1431.283) 
-15088.28** 
(4764.587) 
 3727.584*** 
(463.661) 
997.283 
(1431.283) 
-15088.28** 
(4764.587) 
Op2 3.715 
(12.709) 
-217.918*** 
(56.643) 
312.260 
(179.973) 
-11.628 
(15.333) 
-217.918*** 
(56.643) 
312.260 
(179.973) 
Liq1 1.006 
(4.106) 
-116.235** 
(41.917) 
-105.724 
(55.779) 
3.037 
(5.522) 
-116.235** 
(41.917) 
-105.724 
(55.779) 
Liq2 -0.524 
(4.165) 
12.827 
(40.616) 
    -93.834 
(61.226) 
2.460 
(5.402) 
12.827 
(40.616) 
-93.834 
(61.226) 
       
N.of 
observations 
455 301 349 505 301 349 
N. of  
sample banks 
53 54 55 53 54 47 
Adjusted  
R-squared 
0.6460 0.6163 0.6448 0.6191 0.6163 0.6448 
   
 
CDS t-1 
 
CDS t+1 
Variable Pre-crisis 
period 
During the 
crisis period 
post crisis 
period 
Pre-crisis  
Period 
During the  
crisis period 
post crisis 
period 
Qa1 195.911 
(178.074) 
2949.261* 
(1194.255) 
4829.115*** 
(1108.015) 
154.655 
(175.969)  
  2949.261* 
(1194.255) 
4829.115*** 
(1108.015) 
Qa2 -0.024 
(0.077) 
229.261*** 
(36.759) 
19.218 
(28.917) 
-0.020 
(0.096) 
229.261*** 
(36.759) 
19.218 
(28.917) 
Pat2 -185.803* 
(73.087) 
-1258.094 
(877.093) 
4227.542*** 
(1107.999) 
-350.036*** 
(99.072) 
-1258.094 
(877.093) 
4227.542*** 
(1107.999) 
Op1 285.546 
(337.272) 
-1201.006 
(1660.659) 
-13743.28** 
(4699.187) 
 3170.933*** 
(449.939) 
-1201.006 
(1660.659) 
-13743.28** 
(4669.187) 
Op2 -1.759 
(13.023) 
-103.864 
(66.038) 
303.895 
(179.230) 
-24.423 
(15.928) 
-103.864 
(66.038) 
303.895 
(179.230) 
Liq1 3.940 
(4.139) 
-109.317* 
(49.553) 
-108.554 
(55.669) 
6.525 
(5.630) 
-109.317** 
(49.553) 
-108.554 
(55.669) 
Liq2 -2.625 
(4.060) 
57.716 
(48.108) 
    -68.811 
(61.665) 
0.188 
(5.407) 
57.716 
(48.108) 
-68.811 
(61.665) 
       
N.of 
observations 
471 316 355 524 316 355 
N. of  
sample banks 
56 55  49 56 55 49 
Adjusted  
R-squared 
0.6463 0.5585 0.6730 0.5994 0.5585 0.6730 
Notes: The dependent variable is CDS spreads which measure the probability of default. The explanatory variables are 
balance sheet ratios referring to asset quality (qa1 and qa2), capital (pat1, pat2), operations (op1 and op2), and liquidity 
(liq1 and liq2). The dependent variable and the independent variables are defined respectively in paragraphs 3.2 and 
3.3.  
‘CDS t-1’ denotes CDS spread values for the quarter preceding the quarter in progress; ‘CDS t+1’ denotes CDS 
spreads for the quarter following the quarter in progress. 
The balance sheet data in both panel regressions are at time t (the quarter in progress).  
‘Pre-crisis period’ denotes the period from 1 January 2005 to 30 June 2007.  
‘During the crisis period’ denotes the period from 1 July 2007 to 31 March 2009.  
‘ post crisis period’ denotes the period from 1 April 2009 to 30 June 2011.  
Due to multicollinearity problem between capital explanatory variables (pat1 and pat2), for each time periods 
considered, the panel regression was performed using alternately the two capital ratios. 
Standard Errors of estimated coefficients are reported in parentheses. Adjusted R-squared derives from areg.  
*** denotes coefficient statistically different from zero (1% level, two-tail test), ** 5% level, * 10% level. 
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Appendix 
 
Table A. Summary statistics on CDS spreads for sample banks 
 Pre-crisis period During the crisis period Post crisis period 
Banks (Country) 
Mean 
(Std. Dev.) 
Min. – Max. Mean 
(Std. Dev.) 
Min. – Max. Mean 
(Std. Dev.) 
Min. – Max. 
Erste Group 
Bank AG (AT) 
19.93 
(13.47) 
1 - 75.08 120.46 
(103.78) 
13.69 - 487.13 166.49 
(46.30) 
128.81 – 275.08 
Raiffeisen 
International 
Bank Holding 
(AT) 
37.19 
(36.53) 
1 - 224.97 171.28 
(95.90) 
70.90 - 535 189.28 
(51.87) 
136.97 - 306.05 
Dexia SA (BE) 9.42 
(1.66) 
6.50 - 14 166.55 
(122.76) 
11.40 - 550 263.88 
(54.99) 
183.83 – 342.01 
Fortis (BE) 16.50 
(5.26) 
8 - 31.62 74.83 
(64.75) 
10.80 - 666.70 86.44 
(24.43) 
60.99 - 111.77 
KBC Groep 
NV (BE) 
9.60 
(1.72) 
6.90 - 15.70 126.33 
(76.65) 
9.80 - 343.30 173.83 
(54.49) 
109.54 – 266.07 
Danske Bank  
A/S (DK) 
7.08 
(3.11) 
3.50 - 21 68.67 
(61.87) 
4.10 - 225 98.04 
(27.70) 
69.44 – 153.06 
Banco Bilbao 
Vizcaya 
Argentaria (ES) 
9.71 
(1.36) 
7.10 - 16.50 76.08 
(36.76) 
11.50 - 184.95 164.08 
(67.34) 
78.15 – 249.35 
Banco de 
Sabadell SA 
(ES) 
24.20 
(0) 
24.20 
(0) 
167.02 
(97.92) 
19.60 - 371.66 274.95 
(83.21) 
146.94 – 406.30 
Banco Popular 
Espanol (ES) 
11.27 
(3.92) 
7.97 - 31.54 116.50 
(112.71) 
14.78 - 340 278.19 
(99.07) 
139.02 - 439.06 
Banco 
Santander SA 
(ES) 
10.22 
(1.67) 
7 - 17.50 78.21 
(37.61) 
11.50 - 183.61 151.97 
(60.17) 
76.58 – 239.59 
Caja de 
Ahorros de 
Valencia 
Castellon Y 
Alicante 
Bancaja  (ES) 
16.58 
(4.06) 
9.50 - 31.36 387.21 
(299.71) 
28.60 - 1,148 475.85 
(112.84) 
368.08 – 624.91 
Caja de Madrid 
(ES) 
21.45 
(3.03) 
14.80 - 27.05 284.59 
(236.85) 
23 - 750 464.98 
(102.51) 
345.95 – 612.50 
Banque 
Federale des 
Banques (FR) 
68.13 
(55.44) 
1 - 265.92 14.78 
(0) 
14.78 24.61 
(19.66) 
14.78 – 54.11 
BNP Paribas 
(FR) 
7.81 
(1.97) 
5 - 14.50 54.99 
(25.49) 
7.50 - 143.13 88.51 
(21.01) 
57.17 – 107.71 
Crédit Agricole 
SA (FR) 
8.06 
(1.84) 
5.50 - 13.50 70.69 
(32.96) 
8 - 165 119.46 
(27.36) 
83.66 – 148.67 
Natixis (FR) 9.28 
(1.79) 
6.30 - 15 145.67 
(93.63) 
10.30 - 390.18 167.18 
(48.94) 
121.27 – 283.78 
Société 
Générale (FR) 
8.64 
(2.30) 
5.70 - 15.50 73.33 
(35.83) 
8.50 - 165 113.45 
(23.73) 
83.29 - 141.93 
Deutsche Bank 
AG Registered 
(DE) 
13.61 
(2.99) 
8.70 - 26.30 82.92 
(38.69) 
14.50 - 186.20 103.88 
(16.65) 
77.40 – 136.33 
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Deutsche 
Postbank AG 
(DE) 
20.50 
(3.17) 
6.50 - 28.90 54.73 
(23.50) 
18.30 - 105.30 60.41 
(12.78) 
44.32 – 74.24 
Allied Irish 
Banks PLC 
(IE) 
8.81 
(2.35) 
5.70 - 17.50 151.09 
(137.56) 
10.40 - 646.72 637.44 
(506.98) 
223.69 – 1,544 
Anglo Irish 
Bank 
Corporation 
LTD (IE) 
20.20 
(5.93) 
3 - 41 279.13 
(210.52) 
14 - 950 460.165 
(111.09) 
340.19 – 590.63 
Bank of Ireland 
(IE) 
8.62 
(1.79) 
5 - 14.50 169.04 
(147.37) 
10.10 - 670.28 287.81 
(73.76) 
207.17 – 377.62 
Banca Monte 
dei Paschi di 
Siena (IT) 
13.70 
(4.82) 
6 - 25 75.40 
(35.01) 
9.50 - 171.68 151.33 
(74.15) 
65.80 – 275.06 
Banco Popolare 
SCARL (IT) 
21.98 
(5.36) 
11 - 37.79 18.07 
(6.62) 
14 - 28.39 227.30 
(43.78) 
170.72 - 287.81 
Intesa 
SanPaolo (IT) 
11.78 
(3.78) 
5.40 - 19.50 66.65 
(39.51) 
8.50 - 200 108.57 
(42.22) 
54.78 – 173.78 
UBI Banca 
SCPA (IT) 
17.63 
(2.80) 
10 – 25 70.48 
(50.75) 
13 - 190 135.89 
(53.92) 
67.72 – 199.23 
Unicredit SPA 
(IT) 
12.84 
(2.76) 
7 - 20.70 83.64 
(50.70) 
10 - 278.74 122.88 
(27.96) 
90.24 – 157.84 
Rabobank (NL) 6.21 
(2.01) 
2.50 - 10 69.21 
(50.96) 
5 - 204.30 82.80 
(28.95) 
65.54 – 125.85 
DNB NOR 
ASA (NO) 
- - 100.27 
(45.30) 
37.50 - 188.11 79.10 
(21) 
60.57 - 131.62 
Banco Espirito 
Santo (PT) 
13.33 
(3.10) 
8.20 - 22.70 91.32 
(44.56) 
12.50 - 230 370.90 
(245.29) 
118.99 - 700.95 
Nordea Bank 
AB (SE) 
11.05 
(2.67) 
5 - 19.31 61.43 
(42.45) 
14.78 - 165 77.55 
(15.69) 
58.63 – 114.04 
Skandinaviska 
Enskilda 
Banken (SE) 
15.59 
(9.66) 
6.68 - 31.54 79.72 
(69.28) 
8.33 - 281.50 110.91 
(35.70) 
80.80 - 189.84 
Svenska 
Handelsbanken 
(SE) 
12.06 
(3.34) 
5.41 - 19.31 51.11 
(42.08) 
14.78 - 163.40 67.15 
(19.57) 
51.01 – 114.41 
Swedbank AB 
(SE) 
25.39 
(7.82) 
10.94 - 35.24 89.95 
(96.55) 
14.78 - 362 131.38 
(65.38) 
84.57 – 266.09 
Credit Suisse 
Group AG 
(SW) 
14.90 
(3.73) 
9.20 - 25.50 98.42 
(55.14) 
17.50 - 262.88 95.13 
(19.91) 
71.05 – 130.07 
Alliance & 
Leicester PLC 
(UK) 
14.36 
(12.42) 
1 - 78.78 131.33 
(88.15) 
11.78 - 471 82.13 
(21.15) 
65.08 – 112.84 
Barclays PLC 
(UK) 
8.52 
(1.94) 
5.30 - 15.80 103.14 
(59.44) 
11 - 270 114.41 
(28.23) 
82.31 – 164.75 
Bradford & 
Bingley PLC 
(UK) 
25.04 
(16.08) 
1 - 84.56 320.93 
(298.33) 
31.67 - 1,591 439.34 
(80.51) 
325.40 - 610.20 
HBOS PLC 
8.44 
(2.58) 
4.90 - 16.50 118.43 
(69.90) 
11.40 - 500.80 161.76 
(20.62) 
123.86 - 183.62 
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(UK) 
HSBC 
Holdings PLC 
(UK) 
8.46 
(2.19) 
4.90 - 15.50 70.89 
(38.04) 
10.40 - 170.59 78.29 
(13.62) 
56.66 - 101.19 
Lloyds 
Banking Group 
PLC (UK) 
6.97 
(2.43) 
3.50 - 15.50 75.60 
(49.77) 
6.50 - 221.05 168.27 
(28.20) 
120.64 - 198.72 
Royal Bank of 
Scotland Group 
(UK) 
7.84 
(2.50) 
3.50 - 15.50 98.92 
(57.50) 
9 - 299.60 169.83 
(28.80) 
126.14 - 206.66 
Standard 
Chartered PLC 
(UK) 
16.02 
(1.91) 
8.50 - 22.50 40.10 
(23.77) 
16.20 - 63.70 72.89 
(13.92) 
63.70 - 95.14 
Bank of 
America 
Corporation 
(US) 
13.59 
(3.79) 
7.80 - 23.80 108.99 
(71.70) 
13.50 - 400.68 160.30 
(34.41) 
115.26 – 233.36 
JP Morgan 
Chase & Co. 
(US) 
20.94 
(6.97) 
11 - 43.50 95.17 
(44.50) 
19.80 - 242.05 87.95 
(21.16) 
58.51 – 132.45 
National City 
Corporation 
(US) 
21.62 
(4.80) 
10.40 - 29.44 311.84 
(560.67) 
18.30 - 2,969 733 
(0) 
733 
Suntrust (US) 20.03 
(13063) 
10.30 - 44.34 69.85 
(51.94) 
1 - 115.30 113 
(0) 
113 
Wachovia 
Corporation 
(US) 
13.69 
(2.64) 
8.20 - 21.30 162.16 
(124.98) 
14.60 - 1,560 248.80 
(3.50) 
245.47 - 253.75 
Washington 
Mutual INC 
(US) 
35.70 
(10.51) 
18.80 - 63.20 2,138 
(2,580) 
41.40 - 6,235 - - 
Wells Fargo & 
Co. (US) 
11.93 
(3.36) 
6 - 19.20 98.95 
(57.28) 
11.40 - 307.85 108.07 
(28.74) 
85.49 - 182.49 
Mitsubishi UFJ 
Financial 
Group (JP) 
13.67 
(5.44) 
5.50 - 29 69.22 
(38.50) 
6.90 - 163.80 71.51 
(10.25) 
53.78 – 83.14 
Mizuho 
Financial 
Group Inc. (JP) 
28.85 
(7.27) 
12.21 - 34.91 37.74 
(10.48) 
13.50 - 48.50 62.81 
(33.93) 
43 - 135.67 
Sumitomo 
Mitsui 
Financial 
Group (JP) 
13.87 
(5.46) 
5.20 - 25.20 69.97 
(39.89) 
6.90 - 150 92.18 
(34.90) 
57.03 – 167.38 
Aust and NZ 
Banking Group 
(AU) 
8.31 
(1.95) 
4.40 - 13.50 85.10 
(51.37) 
5.50 - 228.27 98.59 
(15.16) 
70.31 – 113.89 
Commonwealth 
Bank of 
Australia (AU) 
8.54 
(2.61) 
4.40 - 19.10 82.15 
(48.39) 
5 - 218.30 97.19 
(15.94) 
67.46 – 112.36 
National 
Australia Bank 
LTD (AU) 
8.30 
(2.01) 
4.50 - 14 85.92 
(51.40) 
4.90 - 225 98.88 
(15.29) 
70.42 - 115.21 
Westpac 
Banking 
8.37 
(1.93) 
4.70 - 14.20 81.51 
(48.52) 
5.50 - 221.73 91.44 
(16.69) 
67.57 - 113.36 
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Corporation 
(AU) 
 Pre-crisis period During the crisis period  Post crisis period 
       
Country Average 
 
 
Mean 
(Std. Dev.) 
Min. – Max. Mean 
(Std. Dev.) 
Min. – Max. Mean 
(Std. Dev.) 
Min. – Max. 
Austria (2) 28.56 
(25) 
1 - 150.02 145.87 
(99.84) 
42.29 - 511.06 177.89 
(49.11) 
128.81 – 306.05 
Belgium (3) 11.84 
(2.88) 
7.13 - 20.44 122.57 
(88.05) 
10.66 - 520 185.75 
(85.04) 
60.99 – 342.01 
Denmark (1) 7.08 
(3.11) 
3.50 - 21 68.67 
(61.87) 
4.10 - 225 98.04 
(27.70) 
69.44 – 153.06 
Espania (6) 15.57 
(2.34) 
11.76 - 24.69 184.93 
(136.92) 
18.16 - 496.45 272.96 
(147.85) 
76.58 – 624.91 
France (5) 20.38 
(12.66) 
4.70 - 64.88 71.89 
(37.58) 
9.81 - 175.61 112.40 
(50.07) 
14.78 – 283.78 
Germany (2) 17.05 
(3.08) 
7.60 - 27.60 68.82 
(31.09) 
16.40 - 145.75 82.14 
(14.71) 
44.32 – 74.24 
Ireland (3) 12.54 
(3.35) 
4.56 - 24.33 199.75 
(165.15) 
11.50 - 755.66 489.71 
(377.49) 
207.17 – 1,544 
Italy (5) 15.58 
(3.90) 
7.88 - 25.59 62.84 
(36.51) 
11- 173.76 142.53 
(61.55) 
54.78 – 287.81 
Netherlands 
(1) 
6.21 
(2.01) 
2.50 - 10 69.21 
(50.96) 
5 - 204.30 82.80 
(28.95) 
65.54 – 125.85 
Norway (1) - - 100.27 
(45.30) 
37.50 - 188.11 79.10 
(21.00) 
60.57 – 131.62 
Portugal (1) 13.33 
(3.10) 
8.20 - 22.70 91.32 
(44.56) 
12.50 - 230 370.90 
(245.29) 
118.99 – 700.95 
Sweden (4) 16.02 
(5.87) 
7 - 26.35 70.55 
(62.59) 
13.16 - 242.97 96.74 
(45.74) 
51.01 – 266.09 
Switzerland 
(1) 
14.90 
(3.73) 
9.20 - 25.50 98.42 
(55.14) 
17.50 - 262.88 95.13 
(19.91) 
71.08 – 130.07 
U K (8) 11.95 
(5.25) 
4.07 - 33.08 119.91 
(85.61) 
13.49 - 448.46 124.80 
(47.64) 
56.66 – 206.66 
U S (7) 19.56 
(5.67) 
10.33- 34.19 486.84 
(569.96) 
19.58 - 1,930 191.16 
(17.56) 
58.51 – 733 
Japan (3) 18.79 
(6.05) 
7.63 - 29.70 58.97 
(29.62) 
9.10 - 120.76 75.5 
(26.36) 
43 – 167.38 
Australia (4) 8.38 
(2.12) 
4.50 - 15.20 83.67 
(49.92) 
5.22 - 223.32 96.52 
(15.40) 
67.46 - 115.21 
Notes: This table reports quarterly summary statistics on five year senior CDS spreads for the 57 sample banks per for 
the pre-crisis period (1 January 2005 - 30 June 2007), for the crisis period (1 July 2007 - 31 March 2009) and for the 
post crisis period (1 April 2009 – 30 June 2011). 
Mean, Standard Deviation (Std. Dev.), Median, Minimum (Min.) and Maximum (Max.) are expressed in basis points.  
AT: Austria; AU: Australia; BE: Belgium; DE: Germany; DK: Denmark; ES: Spain; FR: France; IE: Ireland; IT: Italy; 
NL: Netherlands; NO: Norway; PT: Portugal; SE: Sweden; SW: Switzerland; UK: United Kingdom; US: United States. 
JP: Japan. 
With reference to the Country Average, the number of observations is indicated in brackets. 
Source: Datastream Database, authors’ calculations. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
43 
 
 
Figure A. Times-Series Graphs 
 
Panel A and B 
        
 
 
Panel C and D 
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Panel E and F 
 
 
Panel H and G 
 
 
Notes: These figures show the relationship between mean CDS spreads of sample banks and the mean of each balance 
sheet ratio used (qa1, qa2, pat1, pat2, op1, op2, liq1 and liq2). The sample period is from 1 January 2005 to 31 March 
2009. The dashed vertical line coinciding with the start of the third quarter 2007 (July 2007) indicates the outbreak of 
the crisis. 
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1 Allen and Gale (2007a, 2007b), Goodhart (2008), International Monetary Fund (IMF, 2008), International 
Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO, 2008), Bank for International Settlements (BIS, 2008, 2009), 
and Brunnermeier (2009) offer a detailed analysis of the subprime crisis. 
2 The International Swap and Derivatives Association (ISDA) released sets of Credit Derivatives Definitions in 
1999 (which were amended in 2001) and 2003. They are: Bankruptcy, Obbligation Acceleration, Obbligation 
Default, Failure to Pay, Repudiation/Moratorium, and Restructuring. 
3 See European Central Bank (2009a, pp.64-70). 
4 A limited number of recent studies focus exclusively on CDS spreads in the banking sector, though with 
different research aims: Kool (2006), Annaert et al. (2009) and Norden and Weber (2010), with a sample of the 
major European banks; Huang et al. (2009), Constantinos (2010) and Hart and Zingales (2010), with a sample of 
the major US banks; Eichengreen et al. (2009) and Calice and Ioannidis (2009), with a sample of the largest US 
and European Financial Institutes (LFIs). Almer et al. (2008), Volz and Wedow (2009) and Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Huizinga (2010) with a sample of banks from all over the world. 
5  In particular, the national outstanding of credit default swaps, which ISDA began to survey at midyear 2001, 
grew from $631.5 billion at midyear 2001 to $62 trillion in 2007, reaching a peak. In the two subsequent years the 
number of CDS diminished, to $38.5 trillion in 2008 and $30.4 trillion in 2009. Recent reduction of the number of 
CDS is principally due to trade cancellations (International Swaps and Derivatives Association, 2010). 
6 The quoting convention for CDSs is the annual premium payment as a percentage of the notional value of the 
reference obligation. Under certain conditions, this CDS premium should be approximately equal to the credit 
spread (yield minus risk-free rates) of the reference bond of the same maturity. See Bank for International 
Settlements (2003, p. 84). 
7  Initially the literature concentrated on the structural models’ theoretical determinants of corporate bond credit 
spreads, rather than CDS spreads. See, for example, Collin-Dufresne et al. (2001), Campbell and Taksler (2003), 
Cremers et al. (2004) and, recently, Avramov et al. (2007). 
8 See Ashraf et al. (2007). 
9 See Bank for International Settlements (2011, pp. 8-9). 
10 ‘TIER 1 Ratio’ is shareholder funds plus perpetual non cumulative preference shares as a percentage of risk 
weighted assets and off balance sheet risks measured under the Basel rules. 
11 ‘Liquid Assets’ denotes the sum of Government Securities, Trading Securities, Cash and Due from Banks, and 
Due from Other Banks. ‘Short Term Funding’ denotes the sum of Customer Deposits, Banks Deposits and Total 
Money Market Funding. 
12 Since the results relative to the post crisis period do not differ significantly from the crisis period, to save space, 
these are not reported but are available upon the authors. 
13 A possible explanation for this outcome will be offered in the section dedicated to the analysis of regression 
results. 
14 Due to multicollinearity problem between capital explanatory variables (pat1 and pat2), for each time periods 
considered, the panel regressions were performed using alternately the two capital ratios.  
15 For more details see Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2010a). 
16 For more details see Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2010b). 
17 Due to multicollinearity problem between capital explanatory variables (pat1 and pat2), for each time periods 
considered, the panel regression was performed using alternately the two capital ratios. 
